United States v. Walker

Time between a trial and indictment is properly excluded under the “ends of justice” provision of the Speedy Trial Act where factors weigh heavily in favor of exclusion, pursuant to United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, delay due to the COVID-19 Pandemic will weigh heavily in favor of exclusion. Additionally, defendant’s challenge to the proper mental state of the “affecting commerce” element of the felon in possession statute fails because that element is purely jurisdictional, and therefore does not require a knowing mental state.

Defendant appealed his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the federal felon in possession of a firearm statute, and the district court’s revocation of his supervised release. Defendant was tried 557 days after his indictment because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment because the district court excluded that time from the Speedy Trial Act calculation, and because it violated the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant also objected to exclusion of a knowing mental state instruction for the “affected interstate commerce” element of the felon in possession of a firearm statute. The district court rejected defendant’s motion to dismiss and the instructional objection. Defendant appealed the issues. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction and revocation of supervised release. The motion to dismiss failed because, under the factors test adopted in United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036 (9^th Cir. 2022), used to apply the ends of justice provision of the Speedy Trial Act, the district court properly excluded the time between defendant’s trial and indictment. The factor that weighed most heavily in favor of exclusion was the district court’s inability to safely conduct a trial during the pandemic. The court also found that defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim failed under an “ad hoc” balancing of factors. Because the pandemic caused the delay, defendant’s release posed a danger to the public and defendant was not prejudiced by delay, defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated. Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514, 530 (1972); United States v. Lonich, 23 F.4^th 881, 893 (9^th Cir. 2022). Finally, the court found the district court did not err in its jury instructions because the “affecting commerce” element of the felon in possession statute is purely jurisdictional, and therefore does not require a knowing mental state. United States v. Stone, 706 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9^th Cir. 2013). AFFIRMED.