Perez-Camacho v. Merrick Garland

Summarized by:

  • Court: 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Archives
  • Area(s) of Law: Immigration
  • Date Filed: 12-02-2022
  • Case #: 19-72063
  • Judge(s)/Court Below: Ikuta, J. for the Court; Lee, J.; & Forrest, J.
  • Full Text Opinion

Under the Immigration Nationality Act (INA), “[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings and must file it within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(A) and (C)(i). However, a motion to reopen is available if the deadline is eligible for equitable tolling which is available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error.” Salazar-Gonzalez v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 2015).

Perez-Camacho appealed a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which denied his second motion to reopen his removal order.  The removal order resulted from a conviction of domestic violence after his admission to the United States as a lawful permanent resident.  Perez-Camacho assigned error to BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen and argued: 1) the removal order was invalid because the domestic violence conviction had been modified by the state court and was no longer applicable; and 2) BIA should recognize principles of equitable tolling of the deadline for motions to reopen because the modification of his conviction occurred after the final order of removal.  In response, the Court reviewed BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  Under the Immigration Nationality Act (INA), “[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings and must file it within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(A) and (C)(i).  However, a motion to reopen is available if the deadline is eligible for equitable tolling which is available, “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error.” Salazar-Gonzalez v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 2015).  The Court reasoned that Perez-Camacho’s motion to reopen was number barred because he first filed in 2005 and time barred because the modification to the domestic violence conviction occurred thirteen years after the deadline expired and Perez-Camacho failed to justify why he filed 21 years after the conviction to apply for modification.  Therefore, the BIA did not err in denying Perez-Camacho’s motion to reopen.  Denied in part, dismissed in part.

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